Marika Kirch

Institute of International and Social Studies
7 Estonia boulevard
Tallinn EE0100

Table of Contents

The problems of ethnic and national identity have been among the central analytical problems for the Ethnopolicy Research Group (Institute of International and Social Studies). The group consists of three senior research fellows and one assistent. Sociological studies have been carried out since 1986. The three most recent surveys (1993, 1994, 1996) have been carried out by national sample.

Short Introduction to the Emerged Social Problems

Estonia, like the two other Baltic states, restored its independence peacefully during a short period of power vacuum in the former Soviet Union. This paper analyzes shifts in ethnic and national identity, social problems and complicating factors relevant to the process of post-socialist transition in this newly independent state.

The idea of the sovereignty of Estonia has a certain link to the re-identification process of all people in Estonia. This process has particular features for Estonians, for Russians and for many others with different ethnic origins. In this paper, we compare only two groups - Estonians as the majority and Russians as the dominant minority.

The so-called "Russian problem" emerged with other problems of the transition period. Economic changes affected primarily Russian people working in large military plants or factories which had tight connections with Russia. It was understable that these people would fear for their future in an independent Estonia, because this meant, first of all, that the preferental treatement previously accorded them (higher wages, social benefits, free housing, etc.) would not be in the interest of the new Estonia. Moreover, these industrial people, mostly Russians and other Russian speaking non-Estonians, had been integrated into the Soviet ideological system. Ever since the beginning of the independence movement, there has been a visible shift in the national identities of Estonians and of Russians in Estonia.

Estonia was quick to define itself as a European nation, independent of Russia and connected with the West politically and culturally. For Russians, the new situation became an identity vacuum which entailed the need to redefine their personal and collective identities. On the other hand, one major finding (noted in this paper) concerns the diverse reactions to the change in sovereignty. According to the sociological data collected by EMOR (a public opinion research center) in May 1990, an absolute majority of Estonians (96%) supported the idea of an independent Estonia, while only 26% of Russians supported the same idea. [See Chart 1, "Changing Attitutes towards Estonia Independence".] This was the reason for the real disharmony between Estonians and Russians.

From the beginning of the Estonian sovereignity movement (1988-1991), minorities policy has been a matter of great importance. It is very important to underline that the policy had more political than ethnic roots, although the tension between different groups did increase during the movement. This sociological fact is supported by the results of many surveys and opinion polls.

As it is generally known, in the independence referendum (March 3, 1991), the majority of the non-Estonian population voted against Estonian independence. By the estimation of Prof R.Taagepera, approximately 30% of all non-Estonians voted for Estonian independence. Another 30% of the non-Estonians did not bother to participate and can be counted as neutral, and 40% voted against independence (18). However, when these people voted against Estonian independence, they did not vote against Estonians but against the dissolution of the Soviet Union and in favor of maintaining the status quo.

The main reason for controversy between Estonians and Russians was the idea of Estonia's future political status. Political tension appeared actually between the two language groups: Estonian-speaking and Russian-speaking. The tension was thus somewhat higher during the secession movement, when Estonian-speakers supported independence from the Soviet Union but Russian-speakers supported the maintenance of the status quo. The dissension between these groups is therefore based on social identification rather than historical hostility or contemporary ethnic intolerance. The focus of the complicated problems is not ethnic as much as ideological and political.

We can summarize the conclusions with this curious fact: even though there was a majority of Russians who did not support Estonian independence in 1988-1991, only 2% of the Russian people intended to leave the republic in December 1994 (according to a sociological study by EPG) (2).

Therefore, the national identity of Estonian Russians has visibly altered since the beginning of the independence movement. This process has obviously brought about many social problems, many of which have been closely connected to identification. Let us characterize these in more detail.

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We proceeded from the conception of S. N. Eisenstadt (3) and O.Wævers-M.Kelstrup (4) concerning the phenomena of ethnic (cultural) and political identity. Political identity is mainly seen as a "sense of political community," of sharing a political project, while ethnic identity is the cultural, organic sentiment of being part of a larger family and deriving one's identity and meaning in life ultimately from the community. Each type of identity can operate at different levels. This means that "national" identity can include both the ethnicity/culture-bound and the state-bound aspects.

Comparing the main features of Estonians and Russians, one can find that during the Soviet period the central idea of collective identity was constructed differently. For Estonians, identity was mainly cultural (ethnic), while for Russians, mainly national (Soviet citizenship).

Another factor is the differing conceptions of the future economy among Estonians and Russians at the beginning of the transition. For example, the idea of renewed socialism was still principally accepted by most of Estonian Russians, while most Estonians saw no future for a socialist economic system at all, according to research in four Estonian cities in autumn 1990. Only 15% of Russian respondents had the similar negative position about socialism in the economic and social spheres (1). The breakdown of the socialist system was thus one of the factors having impact on the identity crisis of many Russians in Estonia.

Estonians and Russians experienced the disintegration of the Soviet Union in different ways. With the appearance of the new ideology of "perestroika," Estonians recognized the great opportunity for separating from the Soviet Union and restoring their national identity. Most Russians in Estonia were disappointed at the loss of their accepted (Soviet) identity. One central dilemma facing Estonia's Russians was that their perceived identification with the Soviet state was significantly stronger than their self-definition in terms of Russian ethnic culture.

Many Russians recognized the new situation as unpredictable and uncertain and therefore strenghtened their negative attitudes toward it. Non-Estonians had to answer questions like: Who are we in the Estonian Republic? What will be our children's future? Usually, people have to answer these questions before they move from one state to another, not after they have lived within the territory for thirty or forty years.

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G. Csepeli wrote, "...national identification must be treated as an integral part of the total transformation of socialist society into a more democratic and open society allowing for greater autonomy in the field of politics, economics and culture" (5). The necessity to change various identity components (including the regime identity) was especially remarkable for Russian people who innocently immigrated to Estonia during the Soviet period. Thus, in analyzing identity alterations, we must not look only to the ethnic aspect but also to identity deriving from connection with territory, state, social groups, religion, and local affiliations.

See Chart 2

As one can interpret from the figures above, most Russians should be characterized by objectively weak linkages with the territory, state, culture and citizenry of Estonia. But the sociological polls assure us that Russian people actually feel much more integrated and connected with the Estonian territory and society, despite their limited knowledge of the local language and their fragile connections with Estonian culture. Let us now analyze more carefully three objective components: place of birth, knowledge of local language and formation of citizenry of the Estonian Republic.

Demographic background and links with Estonia territory
963,281 Estonians lived in Estonia at the beginning of 1989, according to the last Soviet census. This was less than that of the 1934 census, before the Second World War, when there were over 990,000 Estonians. If we take 856,000 as the number of Estonians after the war (1945), then in the years 1945-89, the number of Estonians had increased by 22 per cent. At the same time, the percentage of Estonians among the population has constantly decreased (from 97% to 61.5% in 1989).

In 1989, the share of first-generation immigrants in Estonia was notably high: in the urban population - 32%, in the rural population - 11%, and in the total population - 26% (6).

Ethnic Russians living today in Estonia (436,500 in January, 1994) are not a homogeneous group. The population includes at least four different subgroups defined on the basis of the official statistics and sociological studies (7):

  1. Non-immigrants - Russians born in pre-war Estonia and their descendants, and people born in Estonia during the Soviet period, about 43-45%.

  2. Immigrants from the "near abroad" - Leningrad, Pskov, Novgorod, Tver region, Latvia and Lithuania, about 20-22% of all Estonian Russians.

  3. Russians from Ukraine, Byelorussia and other (Central-Asia, Transcaucasus) former republics of the Soviet Union, about 7-10%.

  4. Russians from remote areas of the Central-Russia and Siberia, about 30-33%.

One can be sure that each group has a different relationship with Estonian territory and culture.

Pure knowledge - one of the main social problems of Estonian Russians
Throughout the Soviet period, the separation of the two population groups: Estonian-speaking people (Estonians, Finns, Ingerians, local Jews, Latvians etc.) and Russian-speaking people (Russians, Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Tatars, Poles, Jews from Ukraine or Russia, etc.) were a voluntary segregation based mainly on different communication languages (Estonian or Russian) but not on ethnic origin. Relations between these two languge groups were cool but not antagonistic. (It is better to say that there was pure communication between these two groups). For many Russians the language and cultural barriers are existing up to today.

The Law on Language adopted by Estonian Parliament in 1989 (revised in 1995) has been directed to change this situation. Knowledge of Estonian as the state language was declared to be a required professional skill for a number of jobs. Language competence is also a prerequisite for citizenship. This became a great social problem for many Russians. Table 1 shows very small differences in the changing language competence of Russians.

The results of the sociological research conducted by Richard Rose and William Maley (September 1993) confirm the same tendency -- the share of Russian people who can communicate in some way in Estonian is 40% (11).

We consider knowledge of Estonian one of the most powerful factors in integration: the person who knows the language understands perfectly the social circumstances of local problems and the Estonian political situation today. It has been shown by several sociological research projects in 1990-92 that knowledge of Estonian is the most significant factor which helps to create a special diasporic identity (Estonian Russian), in contrast to the former Soviet identity (12). Among the younger generation of Russians (born in Estonia in 1950-70), knowledge of Estonian is even weaker than among their immigrant parents. This shows the very weak assimilative impact of Estonian culture and of the educational system on people living in monolingual (Russian) circumstances in industrial cities like Tallinn, Kohtla-Järve, Sillamäe and Narva.

The past four or five years have seen a clear change in attitude toward the Estonian language. Today, the need for knowledge of the local language is appreciated by the absolute majority of the non-Estonian population. About 80% of Estonian Russians have accepted the idea that everybody in Estonia must know the local language, according to the data of various sociological research projects (1993-1994).

The Citizenship Problem

The formation of the new citizenry is also a great social problem connected with problems of identity.

The legal status of resident foreigners and stateless persons in Estonia is determined by the Law on Aliens (adopted in July 1993) and by the Law of Citizenship (revised version adopted in January 1995).

Contemporary Estonian citizenship legislation follows the principle of jus sanguinis. Estonian citizenship is ascribed on the basis of descent, like German citizenship (14). Birth and prolonged residence in Estonia have no bearing on citizenhip status. Estonian citizenship law allows immigrants and their descendants to remain foreigners indefinitely.

Creation of the new citizenry has been the most problematic process in Estonia. According to the Law on Citizenship, people of whatever ethnic origin who have no link with the pre-war Estonian Republic and who can't restore their citizenship through their parents or grandparents, have to apply for Estonian citizenship. It has been very hard for Russian immigrant population to accept this ideology. Nevertheless, the situation is stabilizing today. Data from the Table 2 show that Estonian citizens of Russian origin are growing continuously while the share of Russian citizens among Estonian Russians is quite stable.

The survey in December 1994 showed problematic figures for the share of Estonian citizens of Russian origin -- 35%. According to the estimation of specialists, this figure is obviously exagerated. The explanation may be that people were very sure that they would get Estonian citizenship in the near future, even though they had not yet obtained an Estonian passport.

As one can see from Table 2, the share of Russian citizens diminished from February 1993 to December 1994. There are at least two explanations. One is remigration, which was relatively high in this period -- some people who are Russian citizens moved to the territory of the former Soviet Union. 20,000 people emigrated from Estonia from 1993 to 1994: 2,500 to the West and 17,500 to the republics of the former Soviet Union. Supposedly most of them were Russian (16).

The second explanation: people first took Russian citizenship because the application procedure is much easier, and because it allows them to cross the Russian border to communicate with relatives and friends in Russia. Now they have changed their decision and hope to also get Estonian citizenship.

As it has been recently declared by the Russian Embassy, 90,000 Estonian residents received Russian citizenship by March 1996. Analyzing both citizenship statistics and sociological data, we can conclude that when applying for citizenship, people very often do not make a political decision about their state affiliation but choose the option which is the most convenient for everyday life (getting visas, etc.).

Minority status and social problems connected with this position

The restoration of Estonian independence brought along another principle change: Russians became an ethnic minority in the Estonian Republic. However, most of the Estonian Russians are completely unaware of their new minority identity. This shift of identity from being the leading nationality in one of the world's most powerful states to a minority group in a small republic created a crisis of self-identificational.

There are only about 5-7% (maximum 30,000 persons) of native (autochthonous) Russians who have been living for at least three generations in Estonia, according to the last census and calculations by Kalev Katus (8).

For the autochthonous ethnic minorities of Estonia the process of re-identification occurred naturally and simultaneously. New generations of Estonian Russians, including immigrants, should have accept the identity and status of ethnic minority. According to the surveys (1992-93) less than half of them acknowledge this status (9).

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Our last survey, in March 1996, was designed to research the new economic, cultural and political situation of Russian people living in Estonia and the connection of the changes with their ethnic and social identities. The data processing started in April, and we have here the first results to compare with former surveys.

  1. Territory

    The sociological polls show that most of the immigrant Russians today understand the Estonian state and territory as having a certain integrity. 16% of Russians demand a special territorial status separate from Estonia for the North-East. The statement that this region is Russia's domain was supported by only 3% of Russian and less than 1% of Estonian respondents (see Table 3).

    According to Table 3, respondents consider greater administrative and territorial autonomy to be necessary for Narva, a town on the Estonian-Russian border. At the same time, the share of those who think that Narva belong to Russia is diminishing. Therefore, we can conclude that an absolute majority of Russians consider Estonia indivisible. It also means that they recognize the need to integrate.

  2. Private ownership

    One hypothesis for why the identity of Russians is not shifting rapidly points to both their weak connections with Estonia through ownership and private property in Estonia and their strong emotional ties with Russia.

    It has been often argued that Russians and Estonians have different economic positions, unequal opportunities for economic success, and therefore unequal bases for an Estonian-centered identity.

    Private ownership and property possession today (3-4 years after the start of privatization) is one of the indicators of people's future social status. Table 4 confirms that, in general, there are no principle differences in ownership patterns between Estonians and Russians after a few years of privatization. The percentages of Estonians and Russians who have no land, house, car, etc. are almost the same -- 22-23%.

    It must be underlined that private property dimensions in Estonia today are not comparable to Western countries. One is not rich if he/she has a private house or if he/she is an owner of a large flat. For example, there is no correlation between the respondents' income and ownership of a private house (p=0.04). Private houses given back to former owners are, of course, not modern and in very bad condition. Stock shares still have close to no real value, and most of them are possessed for privatization certificates. The market for immovable property is still very small and insignificant in Estonia. In the future, of course, possession of immovable property may become a serious factor of social inequality between those with restored property (mainly Estonians) and those without immovable property in Estonia (mostly Russians and other Soviet period immigrants).

    The answers of Russians living in central and south Estonia (right column in Table 4) is extracted to show that living conditions and private ownership of Russian respondents depends also on the region of residence. Russians in central and south Estonia live in small towns and rural districts. Their life-styles and patterns of consumer behavior are closer to those of Estonians. Therefore, life conditions and life-style highly correlate with type of town (big or small, industrial center or not).

  3. Self confidence and self-estimation

    What is the prognosis for the personal economic and social status of Russian people in Estonia?

    Table 5 shows that there are differences according to ethnic origin in respondents' evaluation of their own social and economic status. We suggest that these differences may be influenced by different standards of "higher" and "lower" social class definitions for Estonians and Russians. But even if it is so, Russians do not consider themselves as socially "marginal" much more than Estonians do.

  4. Index of deprivation

    The index of deprivation is a complex economic indicator of the economic position of Russian and Estonian respondents.

    It is constructed on the basis of seven indicators:

    1. Respondents have experienced difficulty in paying for municipal services during the last year.

    2. There is a great probability (or actuality) of becoming unemployed in 1996.

    3. If the respondents loose their jobs, they will find themselves in a desperate situation, have to leave Estonia, or have to change homeplace.

    4. Respondents belong to a lower social status group in Estonia today.

    5. Respondents are worried about low income and a worsening situation in education and medical care.

    6. The restoration of Estonian independence has brought more trouble than expected to the respondents.

    7. Respondents are worried in general about their future in Estonia.

    The data in Table 6 confirm that the complex indicator of economic positions and self-evaluations are quite similar for Estonians and Russians.

Personal relations between Estonians and Russians
The nature of relations between Estonians and Russians is very importrant in all the processes of the transformation, for social stability and for rapid integration of a large portion of unintegrated peoples. Several sociological research projects (1992-93) showed that most people in Estonia have never perceived a high level of tension between ethnic groups and have felt no animosity in relations on a personal level. Therefore, we propose that the character of Estonian-Russian relations may promote the identity shift and solutions to the main social problems.

(See Chart 3: Bar Graph - Attitudes of Estonians and Russians toward each other and toward other ethnic groups.)

Chart 3 shows the respondents' attitudes toward people with different ethnic origins. It is somewhat surprising that Estonians and Russians characterized each other as "easy or very easy to live and work together and find mutual understanding."

Results of the research in 1994 and 1996 (Table 7) also confirm that both Estonians and Russians have had mostly positive experiences in their interactions and foresee positive relations in the future.

To be sure that these results reflect the complexity of people's attitudes, we created an "index of conflict," constructed on the basis of the following indicators:

  1. Respondent declares that it is hard to find mutual understanding and to work together with Estonians/Russians.

  2. Respondent proposes that the Estonian Government will adopt an ethnic policy that is radical toward the Russian population (for example, forced repatriation of Soviet-era immigrants).

  3. Respondent considers the Estonian nation as nationalistic in nature, or the Russian nation as chauvinistic in nature.

  4. Respondent is worried about his/her future in Estonia.

Chart 4: Index of Ethnic Conflict shows a very positive tendency: fewer and fewer people have intolerant attitudes toward other ethnic groups in Estonia. In general, we can conclude that ethnic conflict is not a recourse on the personal level. It does not mean that there are no factors creating instability and conflict in Estonia. We consider the main factors of instability external.

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The main differences between Estonian and Russian respondents were their attitudes toward Russia. Complications arise from asking questions about Russia: can Russia become a danger to the Estonian state? Is it risky or safe for the people of Estonia to live in Russia's neighborhood?

The results were fundementally different: the absolute majority of Estonians feel unsafe and fear the specter of provocations from Russia. The absolute majority of Russians do not see any future danger from Russia.

(See Chart 5: Index of "Russian Danger")

We can make one of our general conclusions here, based on several sociological studies in the last six or seven years:

  1. National identity has formed and has concrete meaning for Estonians. Estonian respondents consider themselves members of a nation and citizens of the state. They have a collective responsibility connected with the future of their state. They also feel a certain danger imposed by the international political situation and by relations between superpowers in Europe and in the world.

  2. Russian respondents answer mainly as individuals concerned first of all with their personal futures. They have restored their Russian ethnic identity and created a new territorial identity, as well as other social identities, but they still cannot identify themselves entirely with Estonians state, even if they are citizens. The adaptation of Russians and their subsequent actual integration into Estonian life will be a long-term process that will culminate only in their adaptation of Estonian culture and language.

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(Future Perspectives - European identity?)

Estonian people have to survive two integration processes:

  1. the general reintegration of the Estonian state into the European community of nations, and

  2. the integration of Estonian Russians and other national minorities into Estonian Society.

It is correct to mention that the Russian diaspora in Estonia was "in its nature not only a dynamic process, but also a cultural behaviour" (
21). Today, most Russians have recognized an ethnic identity rather than a Soviet cultural identity. The most positive scenario will be for the former national (i.e. Soviet) identity or the absence of political identity to be replaced by an "Estonian-Russian" "hyphenated" identity (i.e. ethnic Russian but citizen of Estonia).

Jürgen Habermas wrote: "The identity of a political community, which may not be touched by immigration, depends primarily upon the constitutional principles rooted in a political culture and not upon an ethnical-cultural form of life as a whole. That is why it must be expected that the new citizens will readily engage in the political culture life specific to their country of origin. The political acculturation demanded of them does not include the entirety of their socialization" (22).

Many theorists suggest that the new European integration is a matter of identity (23), but that European integration does not necessarily demand the close integration of people, shared culture or homogenity. It is, firstly, a political body that is needed, a political Europe. It is not only the formation of political institutions, but also a normative, political integration. What is needed is the development of political identity. The national level remains the focus for cultural identity and community.

However, Europe has abandoned the idea of the traditional mono-national nation-state. As several social theorists (Karl R. Popper, Jürgen Habermas) have pointed out, instead of an acknowledgement of pure nation-state principles, Europe needs the realization of protection of ethnic, cultural and lingual minorities. The European image and the real European identity of Estonia can be demonstrated by the acceptance of this ideology. This is the only way for a small state like the Estonian Republic to survive and keep its own identity while integrating into the European cultural, political and security system.

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Estonia's problem remains how to assure the members of its relatively large non-citizen population will not be outsiders but equal persons integrated into the society.

It is a task for social researchers to find out what sort of impact the contemporary Estonian citizenship policy has. Does it bring along a segregative effect, where differences between Estonian and Russian citizens increase even more and the real integration process is postponed? Or may be it bring about increasing integration, impelling the real steps of integration? In addition, it is very important to find an answer to the question: can we treat the citizen policy as selective for loyal and non-loyal persons? What basic issue or identity core will be the main consolidating factor for Estonians and for Russians?

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Notes and References

1. In September and December 1990, the authors and ARIKO Consultancy carried out a research project: "The Russians in the social conditions in Estonia", financed by the Estonian Government (interview with 470 Russians in Sept. and with 757 Estonians and Russians in Dec.).

2. The sociological data have been collected by the authors with ARIKO MG (Tallinn) and Research Institute of Russians In Near Abroad (Moscow). In November-December 1994, a study was carried out among a representative sample of the Russian and Estonian population (interview with 941 Russian and 911 Estonians).

3. Shmuel Noah Eisenstadt. Die Konstruktion nationaler Identitäten in vergleichender Perspektive. In: Nationale und kulturelle Identität. Herausgegeben von Bernhard Giesen. 2. Aufl.- Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1991, pp.21-38.

4. Ole Weavers, Morten Kelstrup. Europe and its nations: political and cultural identities. In: Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe. Ed. by Ole Waever and other. London: Pinter Publishers, 1993, pp. 61-92.

5. György Csepely. Structures and Contents of Hungarian National Identity. Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 1898, p.120.

6. Lembit Tepp. In- and out-migration of Estonia. Estonian Statistics. Monthly of Statistical Office of Estonia, No.9, 1994, pp.25-36; Reference Book of Population Statistics. Statistical Office of Estonia. No. 3, 1994, pp.14-27.

7. Aksel Kirch, Marika Kirch and Tarmo Tuisk. The Non-Estonian Population Today and Tomorrow. A sociological Overview. Tallinn: 1992, pp. 8-9.

8. Kalev Katus, Luule Sakkeus. Foreign-born Population in Estonia. Tallinn: Estonian Interuniversity Population Research Centre, 1991.

9. Marika Kirch and Aksel Kirch. Ethnic Relations: Estonians and Non-Estonians. Nationalities Papers (Special Topic Issue). Vol. 23, No.1, March 1995, p.45.

10. Samuel P.Huntington. The Clash of Civilizations? Foreign Affairs. vol. 72, No.3, Summer 1993, pp.101-105.

11. Richard Rose and William Maley. Conflict or Compromise in the Baltic States? RFE/RL Research Report. Vol.3, No. 28, 15 July 1994, p.32.

12. Aksel Kirch. Russians as a Minority in Contemporary Baltic States. Bulletin of Peace Proposals. vol. 23, No. 2, June 1992, pp. 205-212; Marika Kirch and Aksel Kirch. On Estonian Russian and Separatism. Security Dialogue. vol. 25, Nr.1 March 1994, pp.112-114.

13. Rein Ruutsoo. The Perception of Historical Identity and the Restoration of Estonian National Independence. Nationalities Papers (Special Topic Issue). Vol. 23, No.1, March 1995, p.168.

14. Rogers Brubaker. Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992, pp.75-84

15. Nationalities in the Baltic States. A Survey Stady. Ed. by Richard Rose, William Maley, VILMORUS, LASOPEC & EMOR. Studies in Public Policy (No. 222). Centre for the Study of Public Policy. University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, 1994, p.52.

16. Statistical Yearbook. 1994. Statistical Office of Estonia. Tallinn: 1994, p.79.

17. Data from the Estonian Department of Citizenship and Migration.

18. Rein Taagepera. Estonia. Return to Independence. Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford: Westview Press, 1993, p. 194.

19. Juhan Kivirähk. From the Singing Revolution to the referendum of independence. Emor Reports. Vol.1, No. 1, July-September 1991, Tallinn: 1991, p. 13.

20. Changing Identities in Estonia. Sociological Facts and Commentaries. Ed. by Marika Kirch and David D. Latin, Tallinn: Akadeemia Trükk, 1994, p. 37.

21. Robert Hettlage. Diaspora: Umrisse einer soziologischen Theorie. Österreichische Zeitschrift f. Soz-ie. 16 Jhg., H 3, 1991, p.11.

22. Jürgen Habermas. Staatsbürgerschaft und nationale Identität. Überlegungen zur europäischen Zukunft. Erker-Verlag: 1992, pp.32-33

23. Elemer Hankiss. In Seach of a Paradigm. Eastern Europe...Central Europe...Europe. Daedalus. Vol.119. No.1, Winter 1990, pp. 183-214; Rein Ruutsoo. The Transformation of Estonia into a Nation-State. The Search for a New Identity. The Baltic States at a Crossroads. Publications of Dept. of Sociology, University of Jyväskylä, No.5, Jyväskyla, 1993, pp. 95-105.

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