| Location | Nationality | Number of focus-groups | |
| Kyiv | Ukrainian | 2 | |
| Kyiv | Russian | 2 | |
| L'viv | Ukrainian | 2 | |
| Donetsk | Russian | 2 | |
| Village of Olexandrivka (Vinnytsia region) | Ukrainian | 2 |
To the beginning.
To the table of contents.
Characteristics of the expression
of identity for focus group participants depending on their nationality
and educational status.
It seems to be most interesting that
when introducing themselves the participants of the different
focus groups would very seldom stress their nationality, regardless
of their place of residence, level of education, profession and
family details. It appears that references to their educational,
professional and marital status were of greatest importance for
all the focus group participants. This became evident when participants
wrote down the characteristics of people with whom they would
associate themselves. Based on analysis of the forms at hand,
one can come to the conclusion that:
To the beginning.
Focus group participants with university
education.
To the beginning.
Focus group participants with secondary
education.
This kind of self-appraisal, presented
during their introduction, leads us to a conclusion that reference
to national identity is not very typical for the interviewees.
Presently the demonstration of social and economic identification
(educational ranking, occupation, marital status) is more common.
A hidden expression of national identity
is evident in the comments of Donetsk group participants. Speaking
of economic problems and the rise in crime, they either refer
to the situation in Russia or compare it to the situation in mostly
Russian-speaking Crimea or Eastern Ukraine. That indicates their
identification with the Russian or Russian-speaking population
of Ukraine or Russia itself, the latter remains for them a symbol
of former Soviet integrity, where Russians were silently recognized
as big brothers to the other peoples of the Soviet Union. Quite
often, expressing their attitude towards the Ukrainian state and
government policy, they would use oppositions such as "us
-- them." This opposition is an expression of the national
distinction of themselves as a non-titular nationality and simultaneously
has deeper social and political origins as an expression of distrust
in the policy of any country's leadership, which, in their opinion,
would not care about the population's needs. Economic crisis
is most acute in the eastern industrial regions, where the people
are mainly Russian-speaking. There is a danger of a premature
conclusion that the Russian-speaking population suffers more than
others in the transitional period. (This was exactly the mistake
of World Bank experts, who in their 1996 report on the development
of Ukraine came to a conclusion that the Russian part of the population
carried the heaviest economic burden compared to other ethnic
groups in Ukraine. These experts constructed their reports on
the basis of self-appraisal of economic conditions of the people.)
The Russian-speaking part of the population
associates the independence of Ukraine with economic misfortunes
and loss of a sense of integrity with the Union. Given their
objection to a state language, they try to refer to the example
of the U.S. (or more correctly, to Canadian language policy) as
a reason why they don't recognize Ukraine as their state.
Lidia: And now, let us take our
Donetsk for example, it is thoroughly Russian speaking. Here
regulations are already appearing. I read them, for example,
one should lead business correspondence only in Ukrainian language.
To speak only in Ukrainian language. I think it is a propagation.
Let us take for example, the U.S. They have fifty states, and
they have states that speak French. Nobody is oppressing them.
If we take a look at the history of
the ethnic multicultural population and its formation in the eastern
part of Ukraine, we will see that ethnic Russians are one of the
groups that reside on this territory. Another considerable part
is russified Ukrainians, a marginal group after the subsequent
loss of the lingual and national features became a medium of Russian,
that is to say, Soviet identity. A comment by one female participant
illustrates that marginality and alien feeling towards the Ukrainian
state quite eloquently:
The suggestion of another female participant
that Russian extremist Vladimir Zhyrinovsky is a spokesman for
the interests of the Donbas population is not in the least surprising,
because Mr. Zhyrinovsky is notorious for his odious statements
"in favour" and "on behalf" of Russian-speaking
people of the post-Soviet Newly Independent States. All political
utterances of that politician appeal to the psychology of "the
common citizen," usually someone who is socially and ethnically
marginal. Of course, the message arouses sympathy from people
who are disoriented by rapid social changes and who are accustomed
to feeling that they belong to a powerful community -- the Soviet
people. At the same time, speaking of the influence of social
and economic problems, people from Donetsk admit that everybody
in Ukraine, regardless of nationality, suffers from the hardships
of modern times:
Yelena: We don't have nationalism
here, I would say so. There is no suppression of nations; therefore
we are suffering absolutely all equally.
Similar ideas were expressed in other
groups, regardless of their nationality or place of residence.
Roman: I think that both Russians
and Ukrainians are living the same. Because I know so many Russians,
I worked with them; they are doing the same as Ukrainians are
doing. (L'viv, Ukrainian male)
When one first looks through the statements
of the rural women's focus-group, one might think that it consists
of Russian-speaking individuals. So often the bright side of
friendship between Russia and Ukraine are mentioned, and astonishment
is expressed about how it could possibly happen. Once again we
observe economic constraints and the worsening of living conditions
in action in this particular village. The rural population, especially
women, demonstrate some faint national identity. They have never
thought it over; they just were born as Ukrainians, in a Ukrainian-speaking
community; it has never been necessary for them to demonstrate
their identity or to compare it to another.
To the beginning.
Lingual self-determination of personality.
One of the ingredients of an individual's
national self-identification is the problem of lingual self-identification.
Mother tongue is at the centre of the latter as a scientific
problem. Establishment of a native language, as a rule, is part
of the process of a person's ethnic integration.
Considering self-identification of
the Ukrainian population where language is concerned, we should
keep in mind the consequences of Soviet national and lingual policy
which gave birth to the Soviet identity together with unclear
or mixed lingual identity. This is due to national fragmentation
as a result of migratory processes and lingual policy of the state,
which was designed to maintain the development of Russian and
to be indifferent to or encourage reduced use of the Ukrainian
language. We can also recall the prestige of Russian associated
with high social position and promotion of marriages between nationalities.
Not surprisingly, the house-to-house survey of 1989 in Ukraine
showed a lack of correspondence between the stated nationality
and mother tongue for 6.3 million people.
Replacement of native language with
Russian was more or less painless for the majority of people because
the languages are related, the cultures are comprehensible to
each other, and the historical ways, customs and traditions are
often shared. This is how the change of language took place:
a person gains command of another language, after a while it
becomes habitual and functionally prior; the process is complete
with recognition of the secondary language as a mother tongue
and then comes the change in national identity. Sometimes stressful
situations lead to the same results. Here is an example of such
a painful situation that was given by a woman from the Kyiv Ukrainian
focus group:
One young person was depressed and
frustrated since she had to abandon her native language in order
to conform with an urban environment. At that time, the 1970s,
using Ukrainian in the city was considered to be a manifestation
of rural (that is, native Ukrainian) origin. In this case actual
lingual assimilation occurred, while national identity stayed
Ukrainian.
To the beginning.
Expression of national identity
through attitudes towards the break-down of the Soviet Union.
At the beginning of work in the focus
groups, one might have predicted that people would interpret the
split of the USSR and the introduction of Ukrainian independence
strictly according to national identity. Ukrainians were supposed
to enjoy the new opportunities to foster their native culture
and language, express their national feelings, and strengthen
the national state. By contrast, Russians were expected to be
afraid of oppression, reluctant to learn the language, and afraid
of losing their jobs due to lingual incompetence.
However, analysis of their actual
statements leads to a conclusion that the mostly negative social
and economic transformations that happened in the course of last
few years due to independence are in many cases of more importance
for the focus group participants. Strictly speaking, national
issues were not addressed.
The participants with secondary education
independently of their nationality gave the most negative evaluation.
Here we can observe the dependence on geographic location and
social and economic conditions. For instance, in assessing the
situation in Ukraine, people from L'viv would repeatedly appeal
to Polish experience. People from the west of the country have
an advantage to travel across the border more frequently. They
usually go to Poland, where they observe some economically beneficial
developments that are so far unheard of in Ukraine:
Slavik: Well, I worked in Poland,
I worked in the same Poland that we're talking about, I worked
on the land, I worked in construction, I worked everywhere, so
I'm able to compare. Equipment...I wouldn't say that they are
extremely good managers, because I worked on the land for one
of them. He had 14 hectares. If our people worked like that,
here in Ukraine, well, I don't know, they would probably be billionaires
in dollars.
Participants from the village of Olexandrivka
and Donetsk are especially nostalgic for Soviet times when it
comes to economic troubles. They remember the exchange of commodities
in the USSR, everything being cheap, the better life for everybody.
It does not cross their minds that the Soviet economy was regulated
by mandatory principles, that the sources of raw materials were
accessible and artificially cheap for the republics. Judging
economic relations they introduce such terms as "sisters"
and "brothers" for the former Soviet states.
Quite notable is the recurrence of
Pan-Slavism in the image of relations in what was the Soviet Union.
One of the country women kept mentioning "the sister-republics"
-- Ukraine, Russia and Belarus. For her, the other nations of
the USSR seem to be completely irrelevant. Obviously this reflects
national ideas about common origin and similarity that are in
use by politicians who toy with the project of a Slavic Federation,
with the Union of Russia and Belarus is as the first step in that
direction.
As a positive development in recent
years, participants in the Ukrainian focus groups note the possibility
of freely speaking their language:
To the beginning.
The national idea.
Let us take a close look at the tendencies
that can affect the process of national identification being established
in the population of Ukraine.
First, among the objective factors
that can influence the process of formation of national reference
points and values in the people of Ukraine, one should point out
the totally disadvantageous social and economic conditions in
which this process is now taking place. Declared, but not secured
with real achievements, independence resulted in independence
of local authorities from the centre and their own people. Instead
of the promised economic prosperity and growth of welfare, in
reality there has been a raging hopelessness. This has brought
frustration, anxiety, and fear of the future. Instead of national
science, cultural and educational revival there is a loss of what
used to be a matter of pride, the spiritual heritage of Ukraine.
In such a situation, the vision on the level of public opinion
that the abandonment of the Union was a mistake and that independence
leads nowhere is quite understandable.
Secondly, analyzing the expressions
of national identity, we have to take into account that Ukrainian
society is multiethnic, with the Ukrainian ethnos dominating.
For centuries it was split by shifting borders; it belonged to
several empires. As a consequence, it had a special way of participating
in the world and historical developments, being influenced by
different religions, ideologies, state languages and cultures.
That could not help but affect its outlook and appraisal of social
events and vision of Ukrainian history as a whole. In particular,
regions that joined the lands of Great Ukraine in the course of
the last decades (Western Ukraine, Transcarpathians, Bukovyna,
the Crimea) have considerable local specificities. In the consciousness
of the populations of those territories, regional self-identity
prevails over the Ukrainian one. In that context, the division
of Ukrainians into "westerners" and "easterners"
makes sense.
Thirdly, demographic, economic and
social processes, carried out by the totalitarian authority in
some regions of Ukraine changed the proportion of native population
and settlers as a result of migration. Today the regions differ
a great deal in the proportion of urban and rural residents.
According to data from the All-Union house-to-house survey of
1989, 90.2% of the population in Luhansk is urban, while in Ternopil
and Chernivtsi regions it is about 40% (40.5 and 41.9, respectively).
As for the ethnic proportion, the urban areas of Luhansk region
have 81.9% ethnic Ukrainians, whereas Ternopil region has 39.1%
Ukrainians. Hence, Ukrainians of Donbas are mostly city-dwellers;
Ukrainians of the western regions (except L'viv) are country people.
Behind these figures there is a big difference between country-dwellers,
who usually preserve national traditions, and nationally alienated
urban people.
We also should not forget smaller
ethnic groups and national minorities who complete an ethno-social
map of Ukrainian society and make it even more complex.
Speaking about Ukrainian ethnos, trying
to distinguish typical characteristics of the Ukrainian person,
thinking about the essence of political and cultural, spiritual
and cultural, the socio-ethnic foundations of Ukrainian society
and state, we have to consider at least three aspects of the very
notion of Ukrainian people; namely, Ukrainian ethnos, Ukrainians
by origin, and people of Ukraine in the non-ethnic meaning, that
is to say citizens of Ukraine; also ethnic groups for which Ukrainian
land is native (autochthonous Crimean Tatars, Karaites, Gagauzes,
probably, Donetsk Greeks), minorities that consider Ukraine to
be their homeland. The creation of a democratic state and the
culture of political and public patriotic socialization of youth
can only become obtainable under conditions when the interests
of all ethnic communities and groups that reside on the territory
of Ukraine are taken into consideration. "Completion of
national life, which we are trying to gain for the Ukrainian people,
should not interfere with other peoples' values or constrain somebody
else's efforts to achieve free development of the culture and
national forces."
The complex, sometimes dramatic history
of co-existence of people that belonged to different national
communities conditioned the appearance of the formula of Ukraine
as a common home for all its tenants. But this metaphor, "Ukraine
is a common shelter," calls for some specification. "Common
house" is not a hotel on the highway or a residence hall
to stay for only a while. Each house has its landlord and all
the requirements of political behaviour, public decency and loyalty
in the framework of national legislation. In that respect a national
state is one and indivisible, common for the people of all nationalities.
"Ethnic origin is one thing and national identity is another,"
states Ukrainian historian Omelian Pritsak. A citizen of Ukraine
can be Chinese by origin and Ukrainian from a political point
of view. Ethnically speaking Ukraine is not a multinational country,
but a state of a multicultural population, just like a number
of European countries.
1) persons with university education,
regardless of their present employment and family status, identify
themselves with the intelligentsia; e.g., university education,
high cultural level, morality, activity and creativity in their
professional field, responsibility;
2) rural residents identify themselves
by location, profession, and family.
To the table of contents.
Boris: I'm a Ukrainian.
Nikolai: That is, Ukraine has
been my motherland (rodina) and will remain so.
The other participants of the group
would again just mention their birthplace, Ukraine or Russia,
without touching upon their nationality.
To the table of contents.
Valia: I touched this issue a
little bit in the discussion while you asked me what has been
good. That I have traveled around the whole Soviet Union. And
now I think it is very bad that they have partitioned the Union.
They have separated Ukraine from Russia, Russia from Uzbekistan,
and so on. That is to say, I understand it in this way: here
is my hand with five fingers; cut my one finger off, it will be
painful for the other four (fingers).
Vera-1: Ukraine has separated
itself, that is, has decided to obtain independence. What is
terrible is that we were led the wrong way. By us, they started
to accuse everyone, that all of them are so bad. [That meant]
the same Russians, the same Chechens. And we, Ukrainians, we
are independent and we are the best. They had to look at themselves
first. As usual [it is supposed to be made]. First of all, look
at yourself in the mirror, and then say what someone else looks
like. It is supposed to be so. They had to begin with adopting
laws that could provide freedom for your people, that could provide
a secure future for your children.
Vera-1: Well, I think there isn't.
Because what we have in Donetsk? Earlier we even didn't identify
who was Ukrainian or Russian; all were equal. That is to say
that all of us have suffered. It doesn't matter whether you are
a Russian, Ukrainian, Uzbek, or Tatar.
To the table of contents.
Svitlana-2: I think the most important
thing is that Ukrainian and Russian have equal rights now and
Ukrainian does or shock people anymore. I graduated from secondary
school in 1974 in a rural area, I could speak proper Ukrainian
language. When I came to Kyiv I asked on Kreschatik how to get
somewhere... Somebody behind me said: 'Redneck!' And it is important
that now you can hear on the street both Ukrainian and Russian.
We all lived in the USSR. We did not even remember that such
languages as Belorussian or Moldavian existed. We speak Russian
because we have been russified for so long time. Now the attitude
to Ukrainian is normal. We may say there is even a small national
pride.
To the table of contents.
Zenoviy: So, you see, Poles didn't
agree to abolish private ownership of land and of small shops.
They still have the psychology of owners, you see, and among
us this psychology, especially in the central and eastern regions,
has been suppressed, you see, this mentality that a person should
think for himself or herself, not that somebody should think for
him or her...
Mykhaylo: The most important thing
is that we have obtained the independence of Ukraine, we have
the chance to speak our native language. The law about language
has been passed. (L'viv, Ukrainian male)
To the table of contents.